HiPo: The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science

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The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science

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ARTICLES

It is our pleasure to present this year's edition of *HiPo: The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science*. Putting this journal together has been such a rewarding journey for everyone involved. *HiPo* gives undergraduate students an opportunity to have their work published and to give them firsthand experience in what it takes to build and publish an academic journal, as peer reviewers and editors. We are pleased to share this year's outstanding articles, including a feminist analysis of veiling in Islam, a look into post-genocide Rwandan politics, and an exploration of airborne military tactics during the Second World War.

We want to give special thanks to Gina Kennedy for all her hard work as Editor-in-Chief in the early stages of this issue. We would like to thank all of those who submitted to *HiPo*; there were many outstanding papers this year. Furthermore, we would like the thank the authors for providing such passion and dedication that went into their research papers. This journal would not be possible without the History, Latin, and Political Science Department; we would like to thank them for their guidance and support. Finally, we would like to thank our brilliant team of editors; we could not have done it without you.

We hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as we enjoyed putting it together.

DEVYN PATRICK & NINA HOULE
Editors-in-Chief

It is with great pleasure that I congratulate the contributors and editorial team on the publication of this second edition of *HiPo*. In particular, I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the encouragement and ongoing faculty support provided by Dr. Jennifer Knapp.

This journal is a truly a window to the activities of our students and reflects the goal of our department to help foster creativity and critical thinking through the publication of academic writing. On behalf of the Department of History, Latin and Political Science, I offer my best wishes and the hope that this journal, written and edited by students, will continue to promote the efforts of young writers for many more years to come.

PAUL PROSPERI, PHD
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History, Latin and Political Science

VEILING: THE QUR'ĀN AND HADITH
VERSUS FEMINIST NOTIONS

TANAZ DHANANI

The Niqāb and burqa are outer garments, and methods of veiling used by Muslim women around the globe. This seemingly simple affair is met by tremendous controversy when put into practice. Why? In this paper, we will first dissect the prominent anti-feminist critique of the veil as a salient source of its politically charged nature. Second, we will provide a succinct overview of the historical purpose and practice of veiling in Islam as it is positioned throughout the Qur'ān and other pieces of Islamic literature in an effort to negate the anti- feminist narrative of veiling. Lastly, we will identify the consequences that anti-feminist critiques of the veil present for Muslim women. Overall, this paper argues that an analysis of the Qur'ān and Islamic texts on the significance of veiling practices can work to eliminate the Western notion that the veil is inherently anti-feminist. This said analysis is essential as the perpetuation of this false narrative results in negative consequences for the Muslim world.

The niqāb and the burqa are methods of veiling used by many Muslim women around the globe. However, this seemingly simple affair is met by tremendous controversy when put into practice. Clothing, while serving as a practical method to insulate the body from climatic extremes, also serves a social function by informally conveying information about the wearer to their daily audience. The accuracy of the 'information' being relayed by our garments, of course, is ambiguous and often a result of the stereotypes which pervade our society.[1] The notion that the veil is representative of an inherently repressed female population is one of many common responses to this politically charged garment in the West, and as such, is the focus of this work. In this paper, we will first dissect the prominent anti-feminist critique of the veil as a salient source of its politically charged nature. Second, we will provide a succinct overview of the historical purpose and practice of veiling in

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[1]Küster, Krumhuber, and Hess, "You are what You Wear," 2.

Islam as it is positioned throughout the Qur'ān and other pieces of Islamic literature in an effort to negate the anti-feminist narrative of veiling. Lastly, we will identify the consequences that anti-feminist critiques of the veil present for Muslim women. Overall, this paper argues that an analysis of the Qur'ān and Islamic texts on the significance of veiling practices can work to eliminate the Western notion that the veil is inherently anti-feminist. This said analysis is essential as the perpetuation of this false narrative results in negative consequences for the Muslim world overall.

THE CRITIQUE AND ITS SOURCES

There is a prominent Western strain of critique regarding the practice of veiling which presents it as anti-feminist, and as the antithesis of modern expression. In this strain of thought, a veil is a tool used within a patriarchal society to oppress and segregate Muslim women.[2] Within the non-Muslim world, this forced, anti-feminist veiling is often attributed to familial, societal or religious pressures, which signifies the lack of agency Muslim women are granted.[3] Additionally, the veil is understood as the epitome of the sheer backwardness of Islamic society in comparison to the superior West. This 'clash of civilizations' ideology has been upheld by Western political and media outlets over time.[4] Further, Saher argues that Hollywood films such as *Arabian Nights* also popularized the narrative that Muslim women are locked up, awaiting liberation from brown men by their Western allies.[5] This is significant due to the impact Hollywood movies have on popular opinion. An anchor to the anti-feminist veil argument was formed when the Taliban in Afghanistan imposed on the female population a singular form of veiling which was traditionally linked to the elite, rather than allowing Afghani women to choose their method of veiling; this event was skewed by Western media to further perpetuate the narrative of patriarchally enforced veiling.[6] Analysis of Islamic texts, however, allow us to demystify these notions and dismiss the perceived necessity of 'saving' Muslim women.

VEILING IN ISLAMIC TEXTS

There are two main sources we can look to in order to dissect the practice of veiling as it was originally intended within the Islamic religion: the Qur'ān and Hadith. Analysis of these sources is imperative insofar as they allow us to rebut the anti-feminist critiques of Islamic veiling highlighted earlier in this paper. It is important to note that there are many approaches to interpreting these texts, ranging from modernist to fundamentalist, rendering the actual practice of veiling highly varied amongst Muslims.

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[2]Amer,*What Is Veiling?* 125.
[3]Amer, 21.
[4]Cloud,"To Veil the Threat of Terror," 286-287.
[5]Amer, 78.
[6]El Shakry, *Gender and Sexuality in Islam,*" 297.

In the Qur'ān, the hijab (veil) is mentioned seven times.[7] For the most part, these refer to a separation between people, a division or a distinction between groups. These guidelines are presented not to seclude women or deny their liberty but rather to grant them protection and to allow them to live pious Muslim lives while participating in the public sphere.[8][9] Here, we will touch on the three Qur'ānic verses (33:53, 33:59, 24:30) which are most frequently referred to as evidence of Islamic veiling in the Qur'ān. According to Saher, Qur'ānic verse 33:53 is cited as "the verse of the Hijab" and has been regarded as the earliest revelation on the topic of Islamic veiling.[10]

> O you who have faith! Do not enter the Prophet's houses unless permission is granted you for a meal, without waiting for it to be readied. But enter when you are invited, and disperse when you have taken your meal, without settling down to chat. Indeed such conduct torments the Prophet, and he is ashamed of [asking] you [to leave]; but Allah is not ashamed of [expressing] the truth. And when you ask anything of [his] womenfolk, ask it from them from behind a curtain. That is more chaste for your hearts and their hearts. You may not torment the Apostle of Allah, nor may you ever marry his wives after him. Indeed that would be a grave [matter] with Allah.[11]

In this verse, the hijab is in essence a marker or a spatial curtain, used as a tool to enhance the security of the Prophet and his wives, which contrary to popular belief was meant to be placed on men who were instructed only to converse with the Prophets wives from behind a curtain so as to maintain their privacy.[12] The practice of veiling in this verse was largely meant for the elite, rather than the masses. Verse 33:59 on the other hand, does apply to the masses. In this verse, Muslim women are recommended to modify their clothing in order to differentiate themselves as free Muslim women from the 'sexually available' slaves who were often subject to harassment. As such, veiling in this Qur'ānic verse was to be a method of protection for free Muslim women while they were in public: a social marker.[13] Qur'ānic verse 24:31 refers to veiling as well, and here, veiling is presented as a guideline for interaction between the sexes to encourage modest behaviour and ensure that inappropriate, extramarital sexual behaviour or temptation would be avoided.[14]

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[7]Chelhod, "Ḥidjāb."
[8]Amer, 21.
[9]Bucar, *The Islamic Veil*, 24.
[10]Amer, 23.
[11]The Qur'ān 33:53
[12]Amer, 25.
[13]Amer, 27.
[14]Bucar, 30.

Hadith is the second form of Islamic text we will analyze; they consist of the recordings of the words and teachings of Prophet Muhammad, which are used by many Muslims to set precedent for their own actions.[15] Hadith are especially useful in terms of setting the context and chronology of Qur'ānic revelations.[16] According to Clarke, "few Hadith deal with women's modest dress, other than in ritual contexts or to warn against wearing thin clothing or short hemlines."[17][18] Sahar confirms that among the Hadith, reference to women's covering is quite minor and simply warns Muslim men and women to refrain from clothing worn out of "pride" as gaudy clothing is seen as immodest, going against a key value in Islam.[19] The majority of references to approved clothing or shameful parts in Islamic society found within the Hadith refer actually to the modest dress of Muslim *men*.[20] Analysis of these texts informs us that within the Qur'ān and Hadith, the veil for women is in large part a protective tool, rather than a tool used for patriarchal segregation as the Western critique posits.

DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING?

The perception that the hijab is anti-feminist is ironically anti-feminist in itself, and this false perception has consequences that surpass borders. El Shakry argues that simply adopting veiling as a backward and forced institution diminishes and downplays Muslim women's understanding and agency of their own practices.[21] In reality, the burqa, in the eyes of many Muslims, was and remains a liberating invention as it has allowed Muslim women to escape the isolation of their homes and make their way into the public sphere without deviating from the moral underpinnings of modesty and decency that Islam values.[22] For many Muslim women living in Western societies, veiling is used both as a method of resistance to imperialism and to demonstrate their agency to embody their Muslim identities in a Western context.[23] This discussion is imperative because notions of 'anti-feminist veiling' based in popular culture or fear-mongering politics can be harmful for Muslim women. Notions of veiling as oppressive both position Muslim women as if they are in need of saving, and position Islam as an inferior and uncivilized religion which is the open target of colonial attack. These anti-feminist veiling projects of saving women also depend on and reinforce the 'West is best' trope.[24] Moreover, images of Afghani

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[15]Alvi, McDonough, and Hoodfar, *The Muslim Veil in North America*, 218.
[16]Bucar, 24.
[17]Clarke, "Hijab According to Hadith: Text and Interpretation," 217.
[18]Alvi, McDonough, and Hoodfar, 218.
[19]Amer, 33.
[20]Amer, 32.
[21]El Shakry, 299.
[22]El Shakry 296.
[23]Glapka, "Veiled Or Veiling?" 2.
[24]El Shakry, 10.

women as the oppressed subjects of a barbaric and savage religious society in part justified the United States' use of force on Afghanistan in the early 2000's as a liberating endeavour, and may pose a similar risk in the future if the notion of the anti-feminist veil goes unchanged. [25]

In conclusion, the Western critique that veils are anti-feminist perpetuate a pervasive polarization which places feminism on the side of the West's ideologies. Analysis of core Islamic texts such as the Qur'ān and Hadith provide us with a deeper understanding of veiling within Islam, decimating the narrative of the veil as a patriarchally enforced custom. Dispelling the findings of Islamic textual analysis is imperative as the anti-feminist veil narrative is pegged with its own set of consequences for Muslim women including reinforcing the 'West is best' trope and justifying 'liberating' foreign invasions. As such, we must remain weary of uncritically adopting the narratives presented to us by self-serving political media outlets and Hollywood films, among other things. In this case, Muslim women do *not* need saving.

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[25]Cloud, 286-287.

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CALLING FOR CULPABILITY:
ANISH KAPOOR'S *DIRTY CORNER*

MELANIE CRIST

Beginning in 2008, The Château of Versailles has hosted temporary exhibitions by contemporary artists. This paper looks at the backlash incurred against the exhibition by British-Indian artist Anish Kapoor, specifically his sculpture Dirty Corner. After Dirty Corner was vandalized with antisemitic hate speech, the artist pushed back against removing the graffiti, which only compounded the already antagonistic relationship between Kapoor, Versailles, and the public.

This paper posits that Kapoor's refusal to cleanse Dirty Corner of its anti-Semitic defacement confronts France's lingering denial of responsibility in both the Holocaust during WWII, and the nation's burgeoning xenophobia in the wake of the European Refugee Crisis.

The reception to contemporary art exhibited at Versailles has not been warm. Detractors largely fall into two categories: there are those who simply do not appreciate the aesthetic value of contemporary works in heritage context, and there are those who react far more vehemently. In particular, those of royal descent who, backed by the right-wing organization *Coordination Défense de Versailles*, filed injunctions to prevent artists Jeff Koons and Takashi Murakami from exhibiting in 2009 and 2010 respectively, stating that "respect due to the work of Louis XIV" must be protected.[1] The controversy over Koons and Murakami, however, was all but eclipsed by the apoplectic reaction to Anish Kapoor's 2015 exhibition; specifically his sculpture *Dirty Corner*, which was installed on the *Tapis Vert* between the Château and the Grand Canal in the Gardens of Versailles from June to November of that year (Fig.1). The sculpture was abhorred for its form, dubbed by the French media as "the Queen's Vagina" after the artist referred to it in a press conference

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[1]Martin, "Contemporary Art at Versailles."

by using female pronouns, and it was vandalized multiple times—most notably by way of anti-Semitic graffiti that sprawled over much of the installation's surface area.[2] It scandalized the art world, and the nation of France, when Kapoor fought to allow that hateful graffiti to endure, visibly, as "scars".[3] Kapoor's refusal to cleanse *Dirty Corner* of the graffiti deliberately confronts France's culpability in the ethnic cleansing of Jews during World War II, and the consequential latent racism in the present.

Before delving into the issues of vaginal imagery, anti-Semitism, and the overall problematization of *Dirty Corner* at Versailles, a consideration of the sculpture's genesis provides insight on interpreting the title, and what that interpretation says about the intention of the piece. *Dirty Corner* was not conceived specifically for its appearance at Versailles; it was originally installed in 2011 at the warehouse-esque *Fabbrica del Vapore* museum in Milan (Fig. 2). There, spectators were invited to an interactive encounter with the work—a "multi-sensory aesthetic experience".[4] The sixty-meter long cor-ten steel structure, shaped like an oversized baroque trumpet, was made available to guests for exploration. They were encouraged to enter the piece and contemplate the change in diminishing light, space, and acoustics as they walked further into its recess. Inside the exhibition space, a conveyor would occasionally deposit mounds of dirt on top of the sculpture towards the end of its "tail". By evaluating the work's title in relation to its form, a plausible interpretation is that the title speaks to the idiomatic connotations of a "dirty corner": shame and secrecy. When considering what a dirty corner is, in terms of dialectics, the inference is that an unsavoury secret lurks within an entity, hidden from plain sight. In this context the work's title in Milan fits. As the spectator/participant traverses the interior of the sculpture they move deeper towards what is not visible from the surface, into a restrictive, hidden crevice—a corner—that is repeatedly heaped with dirt. The metaphor is not subtle. In Milan, Kapoor's *Dirty Corner* was referred to as a "cornucopia, an ear trumpet, a Tibetan horn",[5] and critics described interacting with the work as "an almost mystical encounter".[6] No outrage, no vaginal references, no graffiti.

In the gardens of the Sun King, the sculpture met a much crueler fate: indignation, scandal, and vandalism. At its exhibition in Versailles, *Dirty Corner* was a display only installation. The *Fabbrica del Vapore's* conveyor belts were eliminated and replaced with permanent earth mounds and giant slabs of raw marble, which mock

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[2]Cascone, "Anish Kapoor Calls Vandalism at Palace of Versailles an 'Inside Job'."

[3]Anish Kapoor, "Dirty Corner," mixed media, 2015, http://anishkapoor.com/1031/dirty-corner-06-09-2015.

[4]Verbeeck, "There Is Nothing More Practical," 234-236.

[5]Verbeeck, 234.

[6]Verbeeck, 234.

the classically crafted statues throughout Versailles' gardens—the slabs exist in their natural state, but for a few symbolically painted blood red, as if to say "we are not hiding anything, not pretending to be anything we are not". Gone, however, was the multi-sensory aspect of the work; everything was look but don't touch. This approach—denying the spectator the opportunity to interact with the work—creates tension between subject and object as the piece becomes a "space of obscurity [...] scatological, abject, problematic".[7] The title, then, aided by a somewhat labial appearance, becomes scatological, abject and problematic in return. No doubt, Kapoor's motivations for exhibiting *Dirty Corner* differed for each setting, yet, in relation to the form of the work, the title's "shameful secret" connotation remains the same. The wildly different aesthetic receptions, however, could not have been predicted. Whereas in Milan *Dirty Corner* was deemed "mystical", in Versailles, it was criticized as a "pornographic provocation and attack against French identity represented by the figure of the Queen", and the graffiti soon followed.[8]

Though critics of Kapoor's sculpture claimed that the identity of France was anti-Semitic, the nature of the graffiti revealed why such an attack may have been warranted: France has a culpability problem. Prior to Murakami's exhibition in 2010, the *Coordination Défense de Versailles* released a statement condemning contemporary art exhibited in Versailles as "the veritable 'murder' of our heritage"[9] — a paradoxical claim, as the heritage of France lacks no bloodshed. As is the case with the history of many western nations, France's involvement in war and brutality dates back as far as the birth of the nation itself, though in the modern era it is the Vichy régime's involvement in what is known as "Operation Spring Breeze" that has left the nation with a permanent mark of shame. On Thursday, July 16th 1942, in the midst of the Second World War, the Vichy government of occupied France sanctioned the roundup of 7,000 Jewish refugees, 4000 of whom were children under the age of sixteen, and corralled them in the *Vélodrome d'Hiver* to await deportation to internment camps and then on to Auschwitz for execution.[10] The event is not something that most post-war French governments have cared to address. Numerous Presidents, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, François Mitterand, and Charles De Gaulle, have openly denied culpability and encouraged France not to be ashamed of its past, stating that the republic of France is separate from Vichy, and therefore cannot be held accountable.[11] In fact, contrition did not come until 1995 when then President Jacques Chirac publicly acknowledged France's involvement in aiding

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[7]Verbeeck, 235-236.

[8]Verbeeck, 236.

[9]Martin, "Contemporary Art."

[10]Burton, "Operation Spring Breeze," 221-222.

[11]Boswell, "Should France be Ashamed of its History?" 237-247.

and abetting the Nazis.[12] One wonders then if the denial of culpability has contributed to a rise in nationalist sentiment. Historians tell us that Vichy's decisions in 1942 were not implemented under duress, but that they were calculated and motivated by a desire for more political autonomy.[13] Yet, there is a persistent discourse of victimization that prevents any real progress of accountability from developing.[14]

That same discourse of victimization is what *Dirty Corner* was met with in Versailles in 2015, and what Kapoor was pushing back against by fighting for his work to sit, sullied with racist vandalism, on Le Nôtre's immaculate grounds where everything is "ordered, geometrical, formal, almost as if it's hiding nature".[15] Traditionalists, royalists, and the "alt-right" claimed to be traumatized by the sculpture as it threatened the "resonance of a specific location [Versailles] that is known and familiar".[16] The work was perceived to be "foreign", an intruder in a place it didn't belong, its contemporary style and defiled appearance at odds with the heritage and history of the Palace in relation to the identity of the nation. Therefore, when taking in to account the previously discussed "dirty corner" idiom, it is clear that the vandalized version of *Dirty Corner* speaks directly to the latent bigotry that had reared its head, and asks its spectators to shine a light into the dirty corners of the country and take a look at the hate and shame that lurks there.

Much of the critical discourse on the controversy surrounding Kapoor's *Dirty Corner* has covered the conflation of female genitalia and the idea that the exhibition of the sculpture was a shameful experience, which polluted the image of France's national identity. Though each of these topics have been briefly touched upon here, a more in-depth analysis of the problematic nature of the conflation lies outside the bounds of this paper. What is left to acknowledge presently, is that 2015 was also the start of the European Refugee Crisis, which undoubtedly impacted Kapoor's decision about the fate of his sculpture. With Syrian and African refugees arriving in Europe by the tens of thousands monthly, the migration was reminiscent of Jewish refugees after the First World War.[17] In a statement released by Kapoor after *Dirty Corner* was vandalized by the anti-Semitic graffiti, he remarks:

> At this time, when we need to have compassion for the thousands of refugees on the road in Europe, the anti-Semitic, racist attack […] brings to

[12]Bush, "July 16: 'Operation Spring Breeze.'"
[13]Burton, 216.
[14]Boswell, 245-248.
[15]Verbeeck, 236.
[16]Kwon, "The Wrong Place," 34.
[17]European Union, "The EU and the Migration Crisis."

the forefront the intolerance and racism in our midst. Dirty Corner has be-
come the vehicle for the expression of our anxiety of "the other" […] I will
not allow this act of violence and intolerance to be erased.[18]

Regardless of his statement, Kapoor did eventually acquiesce to taking action after
being issued a court order, which ironically charged that allowing the graffiti to
remain visible made the artist culpable of "incit[ing] racial hatred".[19] However, in-
stead of cleansing the sculpture of the vandalism and erasing its existence, he cov-
ered it in opulent gold leaf (Fig. 3)—a move he referred to as his "Royal Re-
sponse".[20] Sadly, *Dirty Corner* would suffer two more attacks of minor vandalism
before the end of its exhibition. During its final days in Versailles, a fence was put
up around the sculpture in an effort to dissuade harm-doers. Gone was any potential
for interaction and understanding. The work, labeled abject and offensive was shut
off from the public, signifying that this work was different, something to be careful
of, to be afraid of. It stayed that way, corralled in its wounded state until it was
finally removed from the site and shipped off to exile in a move that is strikingly
evocative of the Jewish refugees being corralled and held in the *Vel d'Hiv'*.

Anish Kapoor's *Dirty Corner*, taken into consideration with the idiomatic conno-
tations of shame and secrecy, called on France to claim responsibility for its in-
volvement in the holocaust, and exposed the xenophobic underbelly of the nation
in the process. It is debatable whether *Dirty Corner* was conceived as a protest
piece, but regardless of intention that is what it became, and at a time when the
persecution of people based on their ethnicity is still acutely problematic in many
parts of the world (see the Gaza strip, the "no tolerance policy" at the U.S./Mexico
border, and the plight of the Rohingya), we need more art like *Dirty Corner* to
challenge intolerance and affect change. How do we move forward? Well, since
Kapoor, Versailles has remained committed to its exhibition of contemporary art
stating: "[The contemporary exhibitions], sometimes emphasizing contrast and
synthesis, show Versailles as a living site always open to creativity".[21] Art *is* cre-
ative, yes, but it also shows faith in the potential for change.

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[18]Kapoor, "Dirty Corner."

[19]Sayej, "Anish Kapoor Sued."
[20]Verbeeck, 234.
[21]Chateau Versailles, "Contemporary Art."

FIGURES

Figure 1: Anish Kapoor**,** *Dirty Corner*, Versailles.
Photography by Fred Romero. October 25, 15.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/129231073@N06/27100356650

Figure 2: Anish Kapoor**,** *Dirty Corner*, Fabbrica del Vapore, Milan.
Photograph by Silvia Sfligiotti. August 6, 2011.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/oinoi/6018608912

Figure 3: Anish Kapoor**, *Dirty Corner*, Versailles.
Photograph by Fred Romero. October 25, 15.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/129231073@N06/27100356650

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RECONCILATION, INTERUPTED:
A LOOK AT POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA AND THE GACACA COURTS

DARA CRANDALL

Amidst the history of colonialism, dishonest government, civil conflict, and brutal genocide, the country of Rwanda is faring remarkably well. How is this possible? What were the methods of reconciliation put forward in the wake of the loss of over 100,000 citizens, and have they been effective? The Gacaca court proceedings have been highly controversial in their use of hard power and coercion. This paper offers a brief look into the use of power and the resiliency of a population.

There was a huge puzzle after the genocide. How do you pursue justice when the crime is so great? You can't lose one million people in one hundred days without an equal number of perpetrators. But we also can't imprison an entire nation. So forgiveness was the only path forward. Survivors were asked to forgive and forget. The death penalty was abolished. We focused our justice on the organizers of the genocide. Hundreds of thousands of perpetrators were rehabilitated and released back into their communities. These decisions were agonizing. I constantly questioned myself. But each time I decided that Rwanda's future was more important than justice. It was a huge burden to place on the survivors. And perhaps the burden was too great. One day during a memorial service, I was approached by a survivor. He was very emotional. 'Why are you asking us to forgive?' he asked me. 'Haven't we suffered enough? We weren't the cause of this problem. Why must we provide the solution?' These were very challenging questions. So I paused for a long time. Then I told him: 'I'm very sorry. You are correct. I am asking too much of you. But I don't know what to ask the perpetrators. 'Sorry' won't bring back any lives. Only forgiveness can heal this nation. The burden rests with the survivors because they are the only ones with something to give.'

-Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda
Humans of New York interview
Posted to Facebook, October 25th

How does a state heal, when reconciliation is mandated by government; when the deciding factor of who is victim and who is perpetrator is defined by race? How does one share one's story of survival when the government writes the script? These are all questions that rise to the surface when observing the implementation of the Gacaca courts in post-genocide Rwanda. The way in which these courts were mandated, conducted and organized has left an indelible footprint on Rwanda's citizens. For many scholars and international actors the efficacy of the Gacaca courts to bring about healing and reconciliation for the Rwandan people is questionable. In order to understand how and why these courts did, and did not succeed, one must look at the complex history of a nation at war with itself, its legacy of colonization, and its place in the international community. For better or for worse these three factors have played a sizeable role in the Rwandan government's approach to reconciliation.

Like most African countries, Rwanda has a colonial past, colonized first by the Germans and then by the Belgians. In the 1930s the Belgian colonizers classified Rwandans as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa.[1] This classification, which acted more like a class or caste divide[2] rather than one based on race, created a hierarchy which awarded advantages to the Tutsi and excluded the Hutu.[3] Prior to the genocide in 1994, Rwanda was struggling to allocate land resources to its dense population.[4] The price of coffee had collapsed, affecting many landholders, and a low-level civil conflict broke out as Hutus tried to claim benefits and freedoms that were withheld from them due to their low status.[5]

In 1993, the president of Rwanda signed the Arusha Peace Accord and permitted a truth commission into human rights abuses and atrocities committed during the civil war period of 1990-1993.[6] The legitimacy and potential of the truth commission was severely undermined due to acts of violence committed against those who were expected to give evidence.[7] Between 300 and 500 people are said to have been killed in the days surrounding the truth commission.

On April 6th 1994, a plane crash killed Juvenal Habyarimana, the president of Rwanda, this is the event which precipitated the famous "100 Days of Killing." One million Rwandans were killed in these 100 days; the equivalent of "the World Trade Centre attacks being repeated five times a day in New York City, every day for 100

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[1] Sarkin, *Necessity and Challenges,* 772.
[2] McGarty, "Twenty Years After Genocide," 378.
[3] Sarkin, 772.
[4] Sarkin, 775.
[5] Sarkin, 775.
[6] Sarkin, 778.
[7] Sarkin, 778.

days."[8] Many outside observers would like boil the atrocity of the genocide down to one issue: tribalism, the oppression of one group by another. However, doing so would truncate the vast complexities of Rwanda's past and heed little attention to the consequences of this past.[9]

The massacre was well planned, methodically organized and there is evidence that those in power at the United Nations and abroad were informed about the planned genocide and chose inaction rather than a strong response.[10] In fact, when genocide erupted the US blocked the deployment of supplemental troops and lobbied for the withdrawal of UN forces.[11] The *Interhamwe* (Hutu militia) were mobilized, carefully selected (some specifically for their HIV/AIDS status) and armed with machetes and farming implements.[12],[13] One person from every 10 households was selected so that each Tutsi community member could be identified by personal connection and killed.[14] On the other side of the violence, Hutus who did not wish to take part in the slaughter of their countrymen were often killed for their refusal to participate.[15]

The violence in Rwanda did not end after the genocide. A wave of killings over took the country, in 1996, with the forced repatriation of 600,000 Rwandan refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many Hutu refugees were identified as survivors of the genocide and killed by angry Tutsi victims.[16] Many Hutus rose up against these acts of retributive violence and used them to justify their genocidal actions as acts of self-defense founded upon years of Tutsi oppression and violence.[17]

By 1997, approximately 120,000 Rwandan citizens we accused of participating in the genocide and awaited their fate in jail. The burden upon the judicial system to prosecute such a large number of defendants was too large for the country to bear, thus a truth and reconciliation commission was desperately needed. [18] Truth and reconciliation commissions are useful in helping nations move from brutality to

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[8]McGarty 379.
[9]McGarty, 378.
[10]Sarkin, 780.
[11]Ensign and Bertrand, *Rwanda: History and Hope,* 7.
[12]McGarty 381.
[13]Sarkin, 781.
[14]Sarkin, 781.
[15]McGarty 381.
[16]Sarkin, 782.
[17]Sarkin, 783.
[18]Sarkin, 788.

understanding; they are tools which guard against ghosts from an unresolved past and collective amnesia.[19]

However, establishing a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) in the small, landlocked country of Rwanda has proven to be an arduous task of nearly insurmountable proportions.[20] The need for spaces which allow victims and perpetrators equal ground to share their stories is essential for the rehabilitation and reconciliation of Rwanda. The tendency of Hutus to justify their killing as acts of self-defense against the oppression of the Tutsis only leads to self-serving grief. The tendency of labelling every Tutsi a victim leads to disproportionate accusations and overwhelming demands of retribution.[21] A TRC should serve to make known the fates of victims, restore dignity to survivors, and allow them to participate freely in the post conflict society.[22]

The method of how the government would heal the fracture of its people was in the form of national unity and reconciliation. "One Rwanda for all Rwandans", was to become the mantra of this blood stained country. In the wake of genocide and in the establishment of the Gacaca Courts, the Rwandan government outlawed the use of racial labels[23] or public discussions of ethnicity.[24] State policies were put in place which controlled how victims were allowed to speak about their experiences during the genocide.[25] For everyday Rwandans, the state mandates of national unity and reconciliation became a source of sociopolitical exclusion (one is either victim or perpetrator, as identified by the state), economic inequality (only victims are entitled to certain social programs), and individual humiliation (guilty by association and not by deed).[26] The Rwandan government "collectivized Hutu guilt" in regards to the genocide and arrested anyone who was involved in the genocide regardless of motivation.[27] It also prevented anyone from being a victim other than the Tutsi, an act that took away the voices of bi-racial citizens, moderate Hutus, and those forced to kill to save their own lives, as well as countless others.[28]

The Government created a number of memorials at mass burial and execution sites all over Rwanda, and every year on April 7th the country moves into a "tightly

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[19]Sarkin, 799.
[20]Sarkin, 799.
[21]Sarkin, 799.
[22]Sarkin, 800.
[23]McGarty, 382.
[24]Thomson, *Whispering Truth into Power,* 108.
[25]Thomson, 108.
[26]Thompson, 110.
[27]Thompson, 115.
[28]Thompson 116.

regulated" 100 "days of mourning".[29] These "days of mourning" serve to remind the citizens of the loss of Tutsi life, but focus little attention on the non-Tutsi lives that were effected both before and after the fateful days in 1994.[30] Bullet holes and explosion damage on infrastructure remain unrepaired as reminders of the genocide;[31] these memorial rituals politicize individual guilt and do not offer much recourse to those who do not meet the state sanctioned definition of "victim".[32] The government also created the *Ingando* re-education camps. These camps were where citizens were sent to learn the state mandated history of the genocide; that Hutus are the killers and Tutsis are the victims. Citizens stayed in these camps for varied lengths of time, in barrack-style accommodation, under military surveillance and supervision, as they learned how to unify and reconcile within their communities.[33]

The Rwandan government's way of handling the many murder and rape cases of the 1994 genocide was to establish a community court system called Gacaca. These are the arenas in which victims tell their stories, the accused stand, and determinations are made about the fates of those involved.[34] This process has been criticized for its negative impact on healing, traumatization of victims and lack of legal representation and right to an unbiased jury.[35] They seemed to "emphasize legal retribution over social reconciliation."[36] This was the government's strategy for truth and reconciliation.

The courts ran from 2005 until 2012. Participation in this process was compulsory, and often in attendance were state agents armed with AK-47s.[37] Research, at the time, concluded that the proceedings reawakened negative attitudes, emotions and social dynamics that were brought about during the genocide. This led to further distrust of the court proceedings, traumatization of victims, increased conflicts, and a deepening of resentment.[38]

This surveillance, coupled with mandatory participation lead to self-preserving behavior and did little to foster reconciliation and willingness to reconcile outside of the formalities of the Gacaca proceedings.[39] The failing of these courts was two-fold: first, the government's segregation of citizens into either victim (Tutsi) or

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[29]McGarty, 383.
[30]Thompson, 117.
[31]McGarty, 383.
[32]Thomson, 117.
[33]Thomson, 120.
[34]McGarty, 381.
[35]McGarty, 382.
[36]Thomson, 160.
[37]Thomson, 163.
[38]Ingelaere, *Inside Rwanda's Gacaca Court*, 86.
[39]Thomson, 162.

perpetrator (Hutu) forced a population to reconcile according to pre-defined roles; second it also failed because it forced reconciliation upon threats of punishment for non-compliance.[40] The proceedings forced the people of Rwanda to adopt a national image of unity and reconciliation, while many of those involved still suffered under the weight of the tragedies that had been inflicted upon them.[41] The Gacaca Courts were a top-down process that forced citizens into roles which greatly differed from their lived experiences.[42]

Despite being widely known for its history of violence, and its struggle to rebuild, Rwanda has become a country with a narrative of stumbling toward cultural reform and reclamation. It has become a country looking to shed its former identity and replace it with a new identity of recovery and survival.[43] The fact that there are still Tutsis and Hutus living side by side in Rwanda is proof that the genocide was a (positive) failure.[44]

In recent years, Rwanda has grown by leaps and bounds. It has moved from 23rd place in growth and development (amongst African nations) to 6th place,[45] and it currently has the largest proportion of female legislators in the world.[46] As time marches on from the odyssey of the Gacaca courts, emotions have begun to settle and a healing peace has begun to take root. Many Rwandans still have mixed feelings about the Gacaca proceedings,[47] about whether they made life better or worse, but would agree that spaces have been established where people are beginning to learn to share again.[48] Compare Rwanda with post-genocide (1945) Europe, where there were few survivors to integrate back into society. Rwanda is doing just that; all while rebuilding an economy, modernizing infrastructure, and reestablishing political structures. This is a monumental task that has yet to be attempted at our point in history.[49]

In the wake of civil war, failed truth commissions, a brutal genocide and a controversial reconciliation process, Rwanda is emerging as a country committed to healing. It is slowly shedding the bonds of caste and colonization and finding its strength in valuing ethnic unity. This unity is the key to future peace and security in Rwanda.[50]

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[40]Thomson, 164.
[41]Thomson, 167.
[42]Thomson, 169.
[43]McGarty, 378.
[44]McGarty, 384.
[45]Margee and Bertrand, 9.
[46]Margee and Bertrand, 1.
[47]Ingelaere, 89.
[48]Ingelaere, 90.
[49]Margee and Bertrand, 7.
[50]Thomson, 110.

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MORE THAN ONE PATH?

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In the minds of many Muslims and non-Muslims the idea of salvation in Islam is quite simple: only Muslims have a chance of attaining paradise and anyone who does not profess to be a Muslim is destined for eternal doom. The ambition of this essay is to argue that from the Islamic point of view, non-Muslims do indeed have a chance of attaining God's mercy and being saved. This will be argued by taking a look at how the Qur'an accepts diversity, verses in the Qur'an regarding other faiths, along with an explanation and commentary on these verses from some of the most learned scholars on the Qur'an. Also, this essay will look at various Prophetic precedents in Islamic history on this issue.

"O humankind, God had created you from male and female and made you into diverse nations and tribes so that you may come to know each other. Verily, the most honored of you in the sight of God is he who is the most righteous."[1] Pluralism and diversity may at times seem lacking in religion. Especially in the Abrahamic traditions, religion may appear harsh and insular. With each respective religion claiming to present the right path, or ultimate truth, adherents of these faiths may simply believe that those outside their faith have no chance at achieving salvation. However, this essay looks to argue that Islam views the matter quite differently. According to the Islamic tradition, non-Muslims have a chance at attaining God's mercy and entering paradise. Unfortunately, in the minds of many Muslims the belief is that, indeed, if one does not utter the shahada[2] or believe in the prophethood of Muhammad, one is destined for eternal punishment. This view arises from either an austere and pessimistic view of the world, a superficial reading of Islamic holy texts, or a lack of understanding of the rich history and diversity in the Islamic tradition. The argument of this essay will be supported by looking at

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[1] Qur'an 49:13.
[2] The Islamic testimony of faith which translates as: There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger.

how the Qur'an accepts diversity, verses in the Qur'an regarding other faiths along with an explanation and commentary of these verses from some of the most learned scholars on the Qur'an. Also, we will look at various Prophetic precedents in Islamic history on this issue.

Prior to beginning, it is important to mention that the title for this essay: *More Than One Path* is derived from the first chapter of the Qur'an which states, "Guide us unto the straight path."[3] As the essay will argue, the Qur'an speaks of a straight path leading to God, however, it does not exclude the notion that there are other other means of reaching God.

The Qur'an not only accepts but even expects differences of beliefs and practices. The notion of forcing individuals to accept Islam is strictly condemned. One such verse in the Qur'an states, "And had thy Lord willed, all those who are on the earth would have believed all together. Wouldst thou compel men till they become believers."[4] Another similar statement says, "Let there be no compulsion in religion."[5] Before proceeding, it is imperative to understand that making someone accept Islam against their will is absolutely forbidden and the Qur'an explicitly makes this clear. That being said, these verses acknowledge that diversity is inevitable. One is to come to believe in God, or deny Him, by one's own free will. The blessing of belief itself is contingent of God's allowing His servants to know Him.[6]

With promulgating a general understanding of human diversity, the Qur'an further accepts the more specific notion of a plurality of religious beliefs and laws. Before examining the verses I would like to note that the Qur'an does clearly state that Islam is the divine truth and commands belief in Muhammad as the final Prophet in a long line of Prophet's sent to humankind over different periods of time. However, the argument is that it also does not exclude the possibility of other paths that lead to salvation.

The Qur'an is replete with passages addressing the notion of salvation.[7] At times, the passages seem to be directly communicating with people of other faiths, while at times, God seems to be speaking to the early Muslim community. As a result, Islamic law itself endorses tolerance of non-Muslims.[8] One such Qur'anic passage

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[3] Qur'an 1:5.
[4] Qur'an 10:99.
[5] Qur'an 2:256.
[6] For more verses regarding diversity and tolerance in the Qur'an see 18:29, 10:99, 109:6, 29:46, and 49:13.
[7] For more discussion on verses pertaining to tolerance in the Qur'an see Abou El Fadl, *The Place of Tolerance in Islam*, 15-22.
[8] For tolerance in Islamic law see Kamali, *Shariah Law: Questions and Answers*, 195.

states, "Truly those who believe, and those who are Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabeans- whosoever believes in God and the Last Day and works righteousness shall have their reward with their Lord. No fear shall come upon them, nor shall they grieve."[9] The first point to clarify is the term "Sabeans." The famous jurist and historian, Al-Tabari (d. 310/923) comments specifically on this word claiming that the word "Sabeans" can be used to mean "to go from one religion to another." Also, it could mean "to incline", as in from one religion to another.[10] According to other commentators the "Sabi" which is the root word of Sabeans could be: people who have no recognizable religion; according to some accounts, there were people who declared, "There is no god but God," but had no rites or books or Prophet, people who worshipped angels and faced the qiblah (towards Mecca), reciting the Psalms, a group of the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) who left their religion, people who think they are following the religion of Noah, monotheists who believe in the effects of the planets, and hence are unbelievers.[11]

Whoever affirms God, the truth in his signs, and believes in God's ineffable qualities, thereafter, the differences in religious paths and the differences in titles attributed to God become secondary. It is appropriate to quote here a rather lengthy passage of the brilliant theologian and mystic Abu Hamid al- Ghazzali (d. 505/1111), in which he explicates this matter intelligibly:

> Christians of Byzantium and the Turks (still outside the Islamic world at that time) would come under God's Mercy. Those who know the teachings and virtues of the Prophet and yet still deny him deserve to be called disbelievers, but al-Ghazzali gives wide latitude in recognizing the obstacles to this knowledge. How could a Turk who had never heard of Muhammad be faulted? Moreover, why should a person who grows up hearing the Prophet Muhammad referred to as "the great liar" investigate his truth claims, since one would not expect the same from a Muslim who hears of someone accused of being a false Prophet? Hearing the name Muhammad means nothing if one learns only of the opposite of his true attributes. One could extend this reasoning to point out that one is unlikely to deem a religion good or desire to learn about it, if the only followers one meets are bad. Such mitigating circumstances, namely, that birthplace, upbringing, and social experience mediate one's knowledge of religion, provide ample space for God's Mercy to encompass those who believe in Him and in the Hereafter and act righteously.[12]

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[9] Qur'an 2:62 and 5:69.
[10] Al-Tabari, *Tafsir al-Tabari: al-musammá Jami' al-bayan fi ta'wil al-Qur'an*.
[11] Nasr, *The Study Quran*, 31.
[12] Al-Ghazali*, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam.*

The quote implies that one cannot be called to account for not adhering to the faith of Islam if all one ever received was false or negative information concerning the religion and although the paths may be different, the oneness lies in the origin.

Alongside various passages from the Qur'an, there are also many reports and incidents attributed to the Prophet Muhammad in which one can derive that God's mercy is not limited only to Muslims. One such report states that the funeral procession of a Jewish woman was passing in Medina when the Prophet was sitting with some of his companions. On seeing the procession, the Prophet stood up out of respect. Some of the Prophet's companions, thinking that perhaps there was some misunderstanding, told the Prophet that the deceased was Jewish. The Prophet responded: "Yes, but isn't she a soul?"[13] In another report, upon hearing that the king of Ethiopia, Najashi or Negus, had died the Prophet performed ritual prayer on his soul with several of his companions. Najashi, who was a Christian, had helped several Muslims when they were being persecuted in the early days of Islam.[14] Importantly, some of the companions were puzzled and inquired, how Muslims could pray over the soul of a Christian? In response the following Qur'anic revelation was relealed to the Prophet, "Among the People of the Book, there are those who believe in God. They believe in what has been revealed to you, and also in what has been revealed to them. They bow in humility before God, and they do not trade for paltry gain God's messages. Verily, those have their reward with God for God is swift in reckoning."[15]

The important concept to note from the above narrations is the honor and dignity that is being given to non-Muslims. Once can derive that despite religious affiliation, the human being deserves a level of esteem and regard simply for being a human. Furthermore, one should conduct oneself with decency with regards to the sacrosanct, such as life. Unfortunately, in contemporary Islam, simply giving your condolence to the family of a deceased non-Muslim, let alone, actually attending the funeral, is frowned upon.

In conclusion, religious plurality and diversity is accepted within Islam and tolerance is not only encouraged, but mandatory. It is clear from the discourse of the Qur'an and from narrations of the Prophet's statements that, concerning matters of eschatology, one must refrain from having such narrow-mindedness. Of course, any individual can apply their pedantic imagination with hermeneutics, however, verses must be interpreted in light of its context, and when taking a closer look at

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[13] Abou El Fadl, *Reasoning With God: Reclaiming Shari'ah in the Modern Age*, 408.
[14] See Ibn Ishaq, *The Life of Muhammad*, 150-153.
[15] Qur'an 3:199.

primary sources regarding various Qur'anic passages, one finds a plethora of interpretations, most of which display logic and reasonableness.[16]

It is important to restate that the Qur'an does stress the prophethood of Muhammad and calls upon humans to accept him as such. The argument in this essay has been that the Qur'an acknowledges that there are different paths to God, and if one does not accept Muhammad as a Prophet for certain reasons, this individual is not immediately destined for hell. Rather, as long as certain other criteria, criteria known only to God, are fulfilled, there always remains the possibility of being the beneficiary of God's merciful grace.

Finally, the lack of understanding of many Muslims and non-Muslims regarding the richness and complexity of Islam has led many to elevate themselves to the role of divine judge and misinterpret God's book with their own whimsical desires. As the Qur'an say's, "Or is it that you say of God what you do not know."[17] There is a famous Sufi saying which is appropriate to end with: "There are as many paths to God, as there are souls in this world." And God knows best.

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[16]A hermeneutical model is concerned with three aspects of the text, in order to support its conclusions: 1. The context in which the text was written (in the case of the Qur'an, in which it was revealed); 2. The grammatical composition of the text (how it says what it says); and 3. The whole text, or world view. Often, differences of opinion can be traced to variations in emphasis between these three aspects. For more on hermeneutical methodology see Amina Wadud, *Qur'an and Woman*, 3.

[17] Qur'an 2:80.

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THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA AND THE RISE OF COLLECTIVIST SECURITY OVER IMPERIALISM

JULIAN VERGARA-WEAVER

This paper explores how events surrounding the Thirty Year's War affected the political hierarchy within the Holy Roman Empire and her various states, as well as thoughts on collective security, state-sovereignty, and international relations across Europe. This essay will examine the Treaty of Westphalia, and the social and political effects that this extraordinary piece of international legislation had on major European powers. This essay will also analyze the influence the treaty would have over future disputes and conflicts arising in post-Westphalian Europe leading into the 21st Century.

The Treaty of Westphalia was a monumental piece of international legislation. Europe had never seen a piece of legislation that affected so many countries on such a large social, political, and economic scale. Although the treaty's primary intention was to end the Thirty Years' War in the Holy Roman Empire, it changed how many international leaders, both current and future, would view international relations and their own countries' power hierarchies. It phased out old political and social institutions that had previously held great power, drastically reducing the powers of political and religious leaders, such as the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope. The Peace of Westphalia, and its aftermath, laid the groundwork for what would evolve into the modern ideas of sovereignty we see today in its promotion of the ideas about the independence of nation-states and the collective European security that still survives today.

The independence and autonomy of nation-states was a central idea in the Treaty of Westphalia and others treaties, such as the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659.[1] Since the Treaty of Westphalia was decided and written by diplomats from around a thousand of mostly autonomous nation-states and various countries across Europe,

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[1]Quainton, "Colonel Lockhart and the Peace of the Pyrenees," 267-68.

it took a unique, sovereignty-asserting view that had seldom been seen before.[2] Before the Treaty of Westphalia, peace treaties had been administered between rulers of nations, but in Westphalia's case this was not just a treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and a European nation; it was a treaty to bring peace within the Holy Roman Empire and subsequently settle the Empire's disputes with the rest of Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia allowed the Holy Roman Empire's nation-states to effectively operate as independent entities and paved the way for states, such as Austria, to pursue complete independence as its own powerful nation.[3] This autonomy was not just gained because the nation-states suddenly decided they wanted independence from the Holy Roman Emperor's control and interference; instead, this was achieved because the Holy Roman Empire's states had the backing of other independent nations. The Treaty of Westphalia was a peace treaty first and foremost for the Empire and countries such as Sweden, and France recognized that if a lasting peace was the ultimate aim it must first be achieved by the Holy Roman Empire's nation-states. In 1644, Count d'Avaux confirmed this sentiment when he proclaimed:

> It would seem that…the honour and profit of France will best be served by placing first on the table the items concerning the public peace and the liberties of the Empire…because if they [the German states] do not yet truly wish for peace, it would be prejudicial and damaging to us if the talks broke down over our own particular demands.[4]

The French count acknowledged the need to have input, not just from the Holy Roman Emperor, but also from a delegation of the nation-states. After the creation of the delegation, its members successfully made several demands which were then granted and imposed on the appropriate European nations; usually by the signing of a later treaty or legislation. In 1648, the concept of international and multilateral agreements was relatively new, but would serve as a proponent of the kind of international diplomacy the world sees today.

Sections I and II of the Treaty of Westphalia showed the Empire and Europe's desire for peace and amnesty. Domestically, this meant the Holy Roman Empire and its nation-states could continue to debate and demand without the fear of war.[5] Now that peace had been achieved, many nation-states rushed to put forward their own demands which, in many cases, included the right to be independent, sovereign nations. From a religious point of view, many of the nation-states were also enforcing tolerance towards Protestants, giving them equal rights as Catholic

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[2]Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe*, 156, 169; Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, 167.
[3]Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy*, 751.
[4]Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, 180.
[5]"Treaty of Westphalia," *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*.

citizens. They understood that legislation that tolerated Protestants would garner strong oppositions from the Pope, so the delegates included a clause that claimed — despite the Church's objections — that the Treaty was valid.[6] This measure is one of the first steps towards unity seen where several nation-states came together to limit the Pope's power and supreme authority.[7] The next step that the German princes and lords within the Empire took was to limit the power of the weak and ineffective Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III. With France and Sweden's support, the German princes were able to gain considerable control and influence over the Holy Roman Empire's internal affairs and their own states within that Empire. Decisions concerning war and trade all had to be approved by the council of princes and electors, effectively making the Holy Roman Emperor's title purely symbolic.[8] Now, throughout German nation-states, real power is concentrated in Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg and Austria. Even though the Holy Roman Emperor's title was seemingly irrelevant in making domestic decisions, his position as the Emperor of Austria still made him a powerful European leader internationally.[9] The political power that many of the newly independent nation-states gained not only shaped the Holy Roman Empire until its dissolution in 1806, but also Europe for centuries.

The Treaty of Westphalia's effect on the Holy Roman Empire's political landscape was felt across Europe as many autonomous nation-states sought to gain greater power and influence. With the Treaty, states gained the right to regulate their internal affairs without the influence or interference of other nations.[10] This meant that the nation-states of Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and others were now free to trade with other nations, such as France and Britain, and also to keep a standing army to ensure the lasting defense of their state.[11, 12] Nation-states continued to exercise their new found powers and grew exponentially over the following centuries as they, and other European nations, made alliances. The Austrian Habsburgs' alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs is just one of the many examples where two separate nations (or nation-states) could mutually agree to support one another in order to quell the growing power of another nation, such as France.[13] Since Ferdinand III could not support the Spanish via the Holy Roman Empire, he chose to do this through his own power in Austria. After this event, Austria was now seen as a growing power on the European stage, and it showed how multiple nations could work together to ensure the collective security of their peoples. Throughout the

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[6]Croxton, "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty," 571-572.
[7]Croxton, 571-572.
[8]Cowie, *Seventeenth Century Europe*, 186.
[9]Cowie, 187.
[10]Sotirović, "The Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and Its Consequences."
[11]Wilson, 777.
[12]Sotirović.
[13]Wilson, 774.

following centuries, this alliance strategy would be seen numerous times, especially in international wars, such as World War I and World War II where, in effect, the entire globe came together to limit Germany's power.[14] In peacetime, this idea of collective security was the basis for modern ideas of collective security organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the 20th and 21st centuries. Organizations, like the EU, help ensure that one nation does not become too large and powerful.[15] This approach was first seen at Westphalia in 1648, and has been a significant and vital tool in creating stable and long-lasting peace agreements around the world.

While the Treaty of Westphalia was primarily conceived as a way to end the Thirty Years' War and ensure a "Christian and Universal Peace,"[16] it was more than just that. Whether intentional or unintentional, there is no doubt that the Treaty of Westphalia and other subsequent agreements, such as the Habsburgs' alliance, helped to bolster the German nation-states and shifted Europe to a more sovereignty-based political ideology which evolved into what we see today; a system where nations are equal and accepted. The Treaty of Westphalia also served as a basis for the collective security of European nations and put forward ideas to ensure that no one nation can becomes too powerful and dangerous; ideas that are still practiced today across Europe and around the world.

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[14]Sotirović.
[15]Sotirović.
[16]"Treaty of Westphalia."

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LONDON'S BLITZ AND DRESDEN'S FIRESTORM: BRITAIN'S BOMBING INITATIVE AS A RESPONSE TO GERMANY'S *BLITZKREIG* TACTICS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

KELSEY WIEBE

Both Britain and Germany participated in aerial bombing initiatives in the Second World War. Germany developed its bombing technique after a failed attempt to invade Britain using the cooperative land, sea, and air Blitzkrieg method, resorting to bombarding the opponent with aerial power instead. Britain engaged in retaliatory bombings on Germany. Both nations targeted cities dense with civilian populations to crush morale while disguising this controversial motive by attempting to strike at strategic points to hinder enemy advancement as well. As Blitzkrieg regressed into a campaign of aerial terror in British airspace, Britain's bombing initiative evolved into the firebombing of Germany. Neither effort was especially helpful or efficient considering the entire war as they were both insufficiently supported by other military campaigns to be a key factor of either country's advancement.

Among the damage and tension that remained throughout Europe after the First World War, nations were attempting to rebuild their countries and reconstruct their defenses. When another war did come only 21 years later, both sides were equally unprepared. The Second World War began in 1939 with a *sitzkrieg*, no overt aggression from any participating nations; Britain was obtaining supply agreements and Germany was strategizing its first offensive. The Allies were less prepared for war due to the economic collapse resulting from the Great Depression in the interwar period. At the same time, Germany was able to build up its military power through its disobedience of the Versailles Treaty coupled with appeasement from Allied countries. Because the Allies had focused on restoring their economies, Germany took advantage of the chance to build up its military strength and strategy. Germany had developed a tactic called *blitzkrieg* that utilized strategic and technological advancements that had been made through the First World War and

the industrious 1920s. *Blitzkrieg* consisted of extreme military cooperation as airpower would support both ground troops and heavy artillery in a swift, pointed offensive.[1] This strategy "intended to leave an enemy psychologically dazed and disorganized".[2] *Blitzkrieg*'s most notable aspect was its heavy reliance on aerial attacks. The attacks set the stage for Germany and Britain's mutual bombing initiatives that transitioned from tactical, targeted attacks to morale-crushing "city busting".[3] Britain, after experiencing the effects of this aerial-only technique firsthand on Germany's account, adopted it from the enemy; when it was used on its own, it quickly devolved on both sides into a spectacle of firepower and resources rather than a depiction of effective advancement.

Germany's successful implementation of *blitzkrieg* in 1940 ended the *sitzkrieg* and led to Axis occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.[4] Britain was left extremely vulnerable to a direct German attack.[5] As Germany conquered the north of France, Allied troops were cornered at Dunkirk. To prove the significance of the German Luftwaffe and destroy British morale, Germany opted to counter any Allied evacuation attempt using only airpower.[6] Though the Luftwaffe was unsuccessful in stopping the evacuation or demoralizing Britain, its presence demonstrated the growing importance of aerial warfare in the Second World War. Germany's next plan to advance across the English Channel and into Britain was dubbed Operation Sea Lion; it necessitated the substantial use of the Luftwaffe to clear a path for the implementation of *blitzkrieg*.[7] Though the Luftwaffe far outnumbered the Royal Air Force (RAF) and targeted their bases in an attempt to gain total control of the airspace during the Battle of Britain, the RAF was extremely determined in fighting off the enemy and won the Battle, thwarting Operation Sea Lion.[8] However, Britain's victory did not stop the Luftwaffe from commencing bombing initiatives on London, known as the Blitz.[9] Not only were RAF resources, factories, and the city of London targeted, but later on, industrial cities like Coventry and provincial cities like Canterbury were hit hard to destroy war production and Allied morale, respectively.[10, 11] Britain was in need of an offensive tactic to successfully counter the continuous, widespread German bombings.

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[1]Roberts, "Hitler's Lightning Strike," 18.
[2]Taylor "Blitzkrieg."
[3]Lawler, "Dresden: The Fire Last Time," 119.
[4]Byrne, "World War II: European Theatre."
[5]Gross, "Royal Air Force."
[6]Byrne, "World War II: European Theatre."
[7]Gross.
[8]Gross.
[9]Byrne.
[10]Gross.
[11]Lawler, 118.

In response to the many blitzes that Britain had to endure, Britain assigned its Bomber Command to commence its own retaliatory blitzing initiatives on Germany to destroy German morale and war industry while supporting Allied advancement. Britain was greatly affected by the bombings that targeted the nation's civilian populations and its citizens insisted on retribution. Considering the bombing of Dresden specifically, Britain chose the city as a target because it served as a refuge for civilians escaping the destruction of the Russian advancement.[12] Britain explicitly sought to demoralize the Germans while also improving its own citizens' morale by satisfying their demand for revenge.[13] Even so, this type of "morale bombing" brought up an ethical dilemma often hidden under the tactical reason of bombing to hinder Germany's war production, much like what Germany's initial goal was in the Battle of Britain. Again using Dresden as a primary example, the city's large consumer industry had been reassigned the task of war production.[14] Dresden was also considered a central communications zone and transport location for the German Wehrmacht.[15] In terms of targeting civilian populations, due to the cities' critical features, Britain's area bombing was often portrayed as a strategic endeavour to halt both German supplies and troops from reaching the front lines to advance. Britain's bombing was also motivated by aiding Russia's westward advancement in Germany's two-front war. Britain's Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee suggested that Russia's involvement was crucial to ending the war as quickly as possible and that attacks on eastern German cities, including Dresden, could aid the ally while creating chaos and confusion between refugees and troop movement behind German lines.[16] Britain considered the mission of its Bomber Command as pivotal to destroying German morale and military efforts while also directly furthering the Allied agenda. Germany's *blitzkrieg* tactics in English airspace had greatly influenced the future of Britain's course of strategic action in the war as large-scale area bombing became the preferred method of destruction.

The Battle of Britain demonstrated the necessity for RAF involvement in Allied defense, but the relentless bombings afterwards in both Britain and Germany showed the tactical aerial aspect of *blitzkrieg* regress into the madness of area bombing. Fearful of another drawn-out war like the one only a quarter century ago, the concept of total war consumed the minds of Allies and Axis alike as constraints and ethics surrounding aerial targeting had weakened.[17] Thinking from the perspective of total war, "incendiary bombs [which] were indiscriminate regarding

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[12]Lawler, 119.
[13]Lawler, 122.
[14]Biddle, "Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory," 424.
[15]Lawler, 119.
[16]Biddle, 426.
[17]Biddle, 429.

specific targets . . . became the weapon of choice for widespread destruction."[18] In response to the Coventry bombings, Britain struck the German city of Mannheim, largely populated by civilians.[19] When it came to "morale bombing", Britain had perfected the strategy that Germany had introduced and used it in unison with other Allied efforts.[20] However, the RAF and Bomber Command suffered extreme losses in their effort to stop German advancement.[21] Due to total war, the area bombing increased in intensity in the last years of the Second World War.[22] Coupled with American aerial power that targeted war industry, the effects of the raids were proportionate and noticeable, but Bomber Command's solo efforts were physically ineffective.[23] The firebombing of Dresden took place in the last year of the war for the three reasons mentioned previously, but the destruction of Dresden itself did not accomplish much for the Allies, like most other area bombings that Britain initiated. It cost Britain lives and resources that could have served more productively elsewhere.[24] Dresden was referred to by Churchill himself as "mere acts of terror and wanton destruction"[25] and raised questions of morality that were to be explored and revamped in the style of American military-objective targeting if the war had gone on longer. Aside from the mostly insignificant nature of the Dresden firebombings regarding Allied victory, Dresden and similar Bomber Command missions raised concerns over ethics and morality that overshadowed any headway the efforts did achieve. Considering the large scope of the area bombings, Britain did accomplish some destruction of German wartime industry. However, the primary goal for the attacks was retribution for German attacks on Britain, as proven by the cities and civilians targeted. The bombings did contribute to some amount of Allied advancement when they were paired with Allied ground troops and American aerial support, but the precision of the *blitzkrieg* strategy that is so crucial for its success disintegrated in favour of retaliation. Instead of using the strategy to quickly overcome the enemy, it was extensively modified and, in turn, perpetuated the devastating effects of total war.

After Germany's showcase of power in 1940 to end the *sitzkrieg*, Britain was in need of effective strategies to overcome Germany's advancement. Germany's adaptation of *blitzkrieg* once Operation Sea Lion was cancelled dominated the aerial warfare practices of both Axis and Allies for the duration of the war. The precision tactic transformed into large-scale area bombings that served the

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[18]Lawler, 118.
[19]Lawler, 118.
[20]Kampmark, "Among the Dead Cities," 270.
[21]Ramsden, "Churchill and the Germans," 136.
[22]Lawler, 118.
[23]Grayling, A. C., *Among the Dead Cities,* 250.
[24]Ramsden, 136.
[25]"Prime Minister's Personal Telegram Serial No D.83/5," Winston Churchill to Hastings Ismay, March 28, 1945.

controversial purpose of crushing morale rather than destroying critical resources. Both sides performed "city busting" attacks on the other: Germany in Britain and Britain in Germany.[26] German targeting of city centers in London and other populated areas under English skies encouraged Britain to reciprocate the actions, and Britain proceeded by initiating firebombing raids in both industrious and provincial German cities. Once the strategy deviated from traditional *blitzkrieg*, it proved much less efficient and served the purpose of terrorizing rather than advancing the war. Only when area bombing was supported by ground troops and strategy-oriented aerial targeting, as *blitzkrieg* dictates, was there a chance of achievement, proven by Russia's advancement westward into Germany. The RAF was able to defend itself during the Battle of Britain when attacked only by the Luftwaffe, so naturally, an area-bombing-only campaign would not succeed in Germany either, explaining the need for further Allied support. Britain realized this by the end of the war, after Dresden, as the ethics of area-bombing and population targeting were finally addressed. However, support from other Allies had already proven to be enough in defeating Germany as the war ended only six months after the devastating attacks on Dresden.

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[26]Lawler, 119.

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THE TEMPESTUOUS LIFE AND WORK OF ARTEMISIA GENTILESCHI: AN ANALYSIS OF WOMEN AND ART IN THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

Nina Houle

Artemisia Gentileschi is a talented master painter, a critical darling among feminist historians, and one of the most dynamic artists of the Italian Baroque era. This paper examines how Gentileschi's gender, social class, and life experiences are all reflected in her art, using her painting Judith Beheading Holofernes *as a case study. By broadly observing the status of women in the late 16th and early 17th century Italian art world, including the relationships between women, education, and social class, Gentileschi's paintings are placed in historical context. Her repeated use of her own face in her paintings, especially in heroic roles such as Judith, is analyzed from two major angles. First, as a means of overcoming her trauma as a rape survivor. Second, as a deliberate imitation of her male contemporaries and their self-commemorating artwork.*

One cannot overestimate the cultural legacy of the Renaissance. In Europe, the centuries from approximately 1450-1650 saw an eruption of the arts in every form in practice at the time. The era was fueled by a spread of humanist philosophy and a resurgence of interest in classical Greco-Roman painting, sculpture, and writing. Alongside these changes in culture, an increasingly wealthy merchant class developed a desire to commission and fund artists. They contributed to a wealth of visual media, music, architecture, and many other forms of artwork.

Though the best remembered figures of the era remain predominantly male, the Renaissance produced a number of intriguing, talented, and enduring women. Using the late Renaissance to early Baroque painter Artemisia Gentileschi (1593-1656) as a case study, this paper examines how the rise of humanism and the flourishing of arts and culture affected women through a number of factors and

variables. These include women's social class, access to education, and their affiliations with male artists, which often granted women access to the arts and allowed their work to survive until the present day. Although women all over Europe were affected by the cultural eruption of the Renaissance, this paper focuses on the status of women in Italy, where the Renaissance first took hold and arguably reached its peak.

Before examining Gentileschi's life and work, it is worth briefly reviewing some of the general cultural and sociological changes that took place during the Renaissance, noting how they affected women. The rise of humanist philosophy and its replacement of Medieval scholastic thinking began as early as the 12th century, but it swept Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries.[1] Followers of humanism "believed they were reviving the glory of the classical age,"[2] casting aside the authority of the church as the sole source of intellectual matter. During the Middle Ages, universities were founded and funded by Christian authorities, essentially giving the church a monopoly on higher education. Renaissance artists and thinkers attempted to cast off the influence of the church by infusing their work with a more individualistic viewpoint, seeing people as capable of great beauty and heroism, with less of a focus on being tainted by sin.[3] They rejected ascetic ways of looking at the world, wanting to actively engage with material reality rather than distance themselves from it. This way of thinking rejected the need for the clergy to teach and interpret ancient texts, opening up new possibilities for education for men and women alike. However, while humanist thought theoretically favoured education for all, as with any point in history, one's social class in the Renaissance ultimately affected one's access to academic learning and artistic training. This is especially true when it comes to women.

As education became a valuable asset for wives, more and more middle-class girls became literate.[4] However, most of these girls were only educated to a certain extent and were expected to choose marriage over learning. They were only taught the basics of a few subjects, and their education was expected to grind to a halt after they were married. Despite the move towards a more secular society that slowly began in the mid-Renaissance, a significant number of female humanists chose to enter convents rather than marry in order to further their educations.[5] A woman's social class directly impacted both her access to education and her access to art. Women from many noble Italian families such as the Medicis, Sforzas, and Estes

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[1] Merriman, *History of Modern Europe*, 56-57.
[2] Merriman, 57.
[3] Merriman, 59.
[4] Chadwick, *Women, Art, and Society*, 68.
[5] Chadwick, 71.

became patronesses and muses for artists.[6] If a woman were to pursue a career in the arts, family connections were crucial. Most of the female painters whose work survives to this day were relatively upper-class or descended from artistic families.

Artemisia Gentileschi is a prime example of such a woman. Born in Rome in 1593, her familial ties granted her access to painting; her father, Orazio Gentileschi, was a follower, friend and sometimes artistic rival of renowned painter Caravaggio.[7] These ties allowed her to become the first woman admitted to the Accademia de Disegno - the Academy of Design in Florence - and to take commissions from artists all over Italy and as far away as London.[8] In fact, it is worth comparing Gentileschi's work to Caravaggio's; they were drawn to similar subjects and maintained similar approaches to composition and contrasting light and shadow in their painting. However, as can be seen below with two paintings of the Bible story of Judith and Holofernes, they handled their subject matter in radically different ways.

It was common practice for Renaissance painters to depict Biblical subjects, but Gentileschi infused her work with a uniquely autobiographical element. Her *Judith Beheading Holofernes* is one of five of Gentileschi's surviving portraits of the heroine, many of which depict her own face in the Biblical queen's role (figure 1).[9] It is easy to understand why the story of Judith, who killed the Assyrian tyrant Holofernes by slipping into his tent at night, getting him drunk, and cutting his head off, resonated with Gentileschi. Her art teacher, established painter Agostino Tassi, raped her in 1612, and a long, brutal court trial initiated by her father ensued.[10] Gentileschi endured torture by thumbscrews to prove her innocence, and although Tassi was found guilty, a rare victory for the time, he only served less than nine months in prison for his crime.[11]

When analyzing Gentileschi's works, it is crucial to remember this portion of her past. Her choices of subject matter were not considered out of the ordinary, but the way she portrays them is infused with an intensity and rawness lacking in many of her contemporaries' works. For example, Caravaggio's *Judith Beheading Holofernes* features a young, innocent-looking Judith, meekly holding out her weapon and shying away from the dying Holofernes with an expression of nervousness and disgust (figure 2). She grips her sword at an awkward angle, seemingly unsure of how to proceed with the blood shedding.

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[6]Merriman, 62.
[7]Chadwick, 100.
[8]Davies et al., *Janson's Basic History of Western Art*, 391.
[9]Davies et al., 392.
[10]Garrard, *Artemisia Gentileschi: The Image of the Female Hero in Italian Baroque Art*, 403-404.
[11]Garrard, 405.

Compare this to the square-jawed determination with which Gentileschi's Judith kills her tyrant. Her whole body is involved in the action, one hand gripping Holofernes' hair while the other hacks away at his neck. While Caravaggio's Judith also holds Holofernes by the hair, she seems to be merely keeping his head in place, while Gentileschi's Judith uses the tyrant's hair to keep him pinned to the bed, preventing him from rising. Gentileschi does not shy away from the violent nature of the scene; Holofernes thrashes about, trying to push Judith's maidservant away as she holds him down. His blood gushes forth graphically, spurting onto the sheets and onto Judith's dress. Additionally, Caravaggio depicts Judith's maid as an elderly woman, passively standing by while the killing takes place. Gentileschi's maid is an active accomplice, pinning Holofernes while Judith hacks away with her sword, setting her entire body in action. Both women have their sleeves rolled up, and both occupy a space in the painting between light and darkness, their faces grim and determined. Caravaggio's Judith is bathed in light and her maid remains confined to the shadows. Clearly Gentileschi's two women are working together to bring down the tyrant.

Given that Caravaggio painted his Judith about a generation before Gentileschi began to work on hers, it is entirely likely that she was inspired by his style and composition. However, she also infused her painting with a deeply personal feel, one that has given her art such an enduring quality and has made her the subject of fascination among feminist art historians.[12] It is easy to imagine her placing herself as Judith and her rapist as Holofernes, using her painting as an act of revenge, or as a sort of coping mechanism (to impose a modern term on a 17th century woman). While these are both valid analyses of her work, they are not the only autobiographical features at play. By illustrating herself as a Biblical heroine, Gentileschi is inserting herself into an artistic canon, demanding respect and admiration from her viewers. It was common practice among male painters at the time to portray themselves as mythical figures; Titian, Michelangelo, and Caravaggio are but a few who slipped their own faces into their art.[13] However, as Mary D. Garrard explains, Gentileschi is relatively alone among female Renaissance painters in doing this:

> For Sofonisba Anguissola, Lavinia Fontana, or Elisabetta Sirani, it appears to have been enough to be accepted professionally; to attempt an innovative artistic contribution was unnecessary, perhaps hazardous . . . By contrast with such women artists who tended toward both stylistic and expressive conservatism, Gentileschi aggressively modelled her style upon the most contemporary trends around her . . . with a dazzling virtuosity equaled by few male contemporaries.[14]

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[12]Garrard, 4-6.
[13]Garrard, 278-279.
[14]Garrard, 6.

Thus, by adding herself to her paintings as a heroine and experimenting with the latest in artistic style, Gentileschi was deliberately attempting to frame herself as someone to be remembered.

Unlike many portrayals of women in Renaissance art, who serve as "muses," objects for their male painters and viewers, Gentileschi's women are subjects: fully realized characters with feeling and agency. As always when noting who had access to education and the ability to make art, the factor of class and proximity to established artists is one that must always be remembered. But Gentileschi was using her skills and the luck granted to her by her upbringing and social standing deliberately. This was a woman doing everything in her power to gain as much respect as an artist as the men around her. For her skills, her story of survival, and her sheer nerve working as a woman in a male-dominated world, she deserves to be remembered.

Figure 1: Artemisia Gentileschi, *Judith Beheading Holofernes*, 1620
Oil on canvas, 146.5 x 108 cm
The Uffizi, Florence
https://www.uffizi.it/en/artworks/judith-beheading-holofernes

Figure 2: Caravaggio, *Judith Beheading Holofernes*, 1599
Oil on canvas, 145 x 195 cm
Barberini Corsini Gallerie Nazionalie, Rome
https://www.barberinicorsini.org/en/opera/judith-beheading-holofernes/

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THE BIN LADEN EFFECT

SEBASTIAN DENNO

The attacks on September 11, 2001 will likely never fade from our collective memory. It was the most devastating attack by a foreign adversary ever to take place on US soil, and a turning point in the way people with brown skin are treated in the US and world at large. This essay posits that these attacks absolutely would not have happened without Osama bin Laden funding them and pushing for their execution. This makes him one of the most important people in several decades (if not the most important) in terms of influencing the way that Muslims, and those presenting as Muslim are treated. This essay also examines the myriad effects of these attacks and by extension bin Laden's effect on US foreign policy.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 left an impact that may never totally dissipate. They were the defining moment for Americans of several generations; to anyone too young to have seen the breaking news of a presidential assassination, these attacks conveyed the same amount of shock. They changed the way the average American viewed Muslims and people of Arab descent and altered US foreign and domestic policy considerably. This also changed the quality of life for Muslims and those of Arab descent drastically, affecting many aspects of countless people's lives. By extension, Osama bin Laden, the man who funded and planned these attacks, is one of, if not the most, influential persons in terms of affecting the way Americans view Islam and Muslims, as well as on US policy in the last several decades. While Khalid Sheikh Mohammad came up with the initial plan for the attacks, and eventually executed said attacks, bin Laden changed Mohammad's ideas to suit his own agenda, and controlled every step of the planning, generally not even bothering to consult anyone else, and usually ignoring them if he did not like what they had to say. [1] Bin Laden even chose who would pilot the planes

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[1] Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda*, 84.

without consulting Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, valuing those who were loyal to him above all else.[2]

Someone who knew him well during the Afghanistan war in Sudan described bin Laden as "a one man show."[3] It seems as though this was the case for most of his life. Born into an enormous family (his father, Muhammad bin Laden's company was worth over two billion dollars by the time Osama was born),[4] he grew into a tall, charismatic leader accustomed to getting his own way. This explains why when some senior members of the Taliban tried to warn him about how dangerous it could be to directly attack the US, bin Laden told them, "I will make it happen even if I do it by myself."[5] Bin Laden had generally had things in life go his way, so it stands to reason from his point of view that his plan would be successful and create a tidal wave of Muslim holy rage to push the now quaking American infidels out of the Middle East for good. So when other, more rabid followers told him what he wanted to hear, that the US had lost its warrior mentality and would break after a couple good terror attacks, Osama decided to do what he did best: ignore dissenters and carry on with his plan. Osama thought that should the US dare to invade Afghanistan, an army of Muslim recruits would rise up against them, as well as the Taliban and various smaller organizations within the nation rising to protect their leader in the fight against tyranny.[6] In retrospect this was a severe miscalculation, and one Osama likely made due to his own false correlation.

In 1980, Osama got a degree in civil engineering from King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and within a few years he had joined in organizing the fight against the occupying Russians.[7] Looking forward to him planning the attacks on the US and one can see some parallels. Osama viewed both the US and former USSR as colonialist, infidel superpowers, and equated fighting one with fighting the other. Ignoring that fighting a guerilla war against occupiers in one's own country is not nearly the same as a generally unprovoked attack that kills thousands of civilians. Osama once said that the attacks on the World Trade Center went better than he had ever imagined,[8] but in a big way they failed. From average Muslims to extremists, Bin-Laden's plot had generally failed to convince Muslims that it was religiously legitimate to target civilians.[9]

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[2]Gerges, 86.
[3]Gerges, 91.
[4]Williams, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror*, 92.
[5]Gerges, 90.
[6]Gerges, 92.
[7]Williams, 94.
[8]Gerges, 84.
[9]Gerges, 94.

In countless other unanticipated ways the plot was a huge success. The easiest way to radicalize people to your cause is to have them feel hated, cast out by the society you want them to join the fight against. This was very much the case following September 11th for anyone in America who looked like they might be vaguely Middle Eastern. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research Institute (ADC) reported that complaints of discrimination against Arab Americans increased fourfold between Sept and Oct of 2001.[10] Furthermore, reports of religious discrimination against Muslims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) more than doubled in the months following 9/11.[11] Arab, Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani men experienced a significant decline in wages compared to non-Hispanic whites post 9/11, and the research that determined this found there were no visible factors except ethnicity that could explain it.[12] Nearly 10 years after the attacks, hate crimes against Muslims remain five times what they were in the year 2000,[13] and in the wake of September 11th, hate crimes against other minority groups actually went down, with the exception of a very small increase of hate crimes against Jews.[14] All of these actions act to disenfranchise and alienate people who otherwise might have had no reason to ever even consider joining an extremist organization.

The September 11th attacks had a much larger impact than just on the lives of Muslims living within the US. Airlines have updated numerous safety features, the most obvious being reinforcing the cockpit door to not allow anyone to come in during a flight.[15] Since all the hijackers involved in the attacks were in the US with legally issued visas, obviously the visa application process has been revamped. In 2010 there were ten times as many visa denials over suspected terrorist links as there were in 2002.[16] Another huge development came on November 19, 2001 when the Transportation Security Administration, or TSA was created. This new government organization has an annual budget of roughly five billion dollars and employs an estimated 69,000 people.[17] The effects were certainly not limited to the US either. An attack of this magnitude demanded strong action from the President, and George W. Bush used this need for extreme action to put into place foreign policy allowing him to shape the world more to America's interests and making sure the conditions that made these attacks possible were eradicated for good.[18] By constantly referring to the attackers as pure evil and calling for an all-out war on

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[10]Dávila and Mora, "Changes in the Earnings of Arab Men," 587.
[11]Dávila and Mora, 588.
[12]Dávila and Mora, 587.
[13]Disha, Cavendish, and King, "Historical Events," 22.
[14]Disha, Cavendish, and King, 33.
[15]Riley, "Flight of Fancy," 151.
[16]Riley, 151.
[17]Riley, 152.
[18]McCartney, "American Nationalism," 400.

evil, Bush was able to parlay his invasion of Afghanistan into an invasion of Iraq. By calling Saddam Hussein evil he effectively equated him to the perpetrators of September 11th.[19]

While showing all the effects of the September 11th terror attacks would take far more room than this paper allows, it should at least be clear that the effects were as far reaching as possible, and the attack was facilitated by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden's control over the Taliban can be best illustrated from an incident in 1997, when the Clinton administration offered them international recognition in their newly taken Afghanistan and millions in foreign aid in exchange for Osama, and the Taliban flatly refused.[20] Before he had even linked up with the Taliban, after the government of Sudan persuaded Osama to leave and return to Afghanistan, a US diplomat said that "sending Osama bin Laden back into Afghanistan was like sending Lenin back into Russia. At least we could keep an eye on some of what he was doing in Sudan."[21] Osama's influence within Afghanistan dates back decades and no attack of this magnitude could ever has happened without his approval every step of the way.

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[19]McCartney, 400.
[20]Williams, 95.
[21]Williams, 96.

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